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NOTE
Campaign Finance Reform: Pollution Control
for the Smoke-Filled Rooms?
With the passage of the Federal Election Campaign Act on April 7,
1972, came the first reform of campaign finance laws in 45 years. The
author examines the changes in campaign techniques that have arisen
during those years and analyzes the consequent inadequacies that have
developed with the older legislation. He evaluates past reform proposals
and follows the slow road to congressional reform of the campaign fi
nance laws. Finally, he discusses and analyzes the recently passed Tax
Checkoff legislation and Federal Election Campaign Act with a view to-
wards determining whether they will provide the means to effectively
regulate the modern political campaign. The author concludes that, al-
though inadequate in some areas, the new legislation is a promising step
forward.in regulating campaign finance.
I. THE DILEMMA OF MONEY AND POLITICS
A. Rising Cost of Elections
N 1972, it is estimated that candidates for all political offices in the
United States will spend $400 million in their campaigns,1 which
represents a 33 percent increase over the 1968 election year when
candidates spent an estimated $300 million, and almost a 200 per-
cent increase over the 1952 figure of an estimated $140 million.
A candidate for the Senate from a major state will face an average of
$1.5 million in financing a primary and general election campaign,3
1 117 CONG. REc 1972 (1971) [remarks of Rep. Lee Hamilton (D., Ind.) intro-
ducing H.R_ 550, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., a bill on campaign finance).
2 Estimated spending by all candidates for political office in the United States
in presidential election years
Year Estimated Spending ($)
1952 140 million
1956 155 million
1960 175 million
1964 200 million
1968 300 million
1972 400 million
The 1952-64 figures on estimated expenditures are from Alexander, The Cost of Presi-
dential Elections, in PRAC riCAL PoLTrics IN TBi UNrrT STATEs 277 (C. Cotter ed.
1969). The 1968 figures are from REPORT Op THE TwNTIETH CEN Y FUND
CoMIussIoN ON CAMPAIGN CosTs ix THE ELECTRONIC ERtA, VoRs' TmM 9 (1969),
and the 1972 figures are from 117 CONG. REC 1972 (1971) [remarks of Rep. Lee
Hamilton (D., Ind.)).
3TIME, Nov. 23, 1970, at 11. This figure may be somewhat inflated because-of
the unusually high expenses of $3.5 million reported by Richard Ottinger in his unsuc-
cessful Senate campaign -in New York.
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about half of which will be used for television and radio advertis-
ing."
It is not mere coincidence that the rapid increase in campaign ex-
penditures has occurred at the same time that television has become
such an effective medium for the politician. The first year in which
television assumed a major role in the campaign process was 1952.
Of the $19.6 million spent on the presidential campaign in that year,
about one-fourth was for television and radio advertising.5 By 1968,
the total broadcast expenditures for the presidential primary and
general election contests had reached $28.5 million.6  Of this figure,
Robert Kennedy spent over $1.5 million7 even though his campaign
ran through only several of the major primaries. And of the two
major candidates, Hubert Humphrey spent a total of $6.1 million and
Richard Nixon $12.6 million for television and radio advertise-
ments.8  With the increased use of television by political candi-
dates, the front porch campaign of a McKinley at Canton, a Wilson
at Shadow Lawn, or a Harding at Marion has become a thing of
the past. Today's candidate must concentrate on reaching large
4 Television and Radio Expenditures of Selected Senatorial Candidates in the
1970 Elections
(both primary and general)
Total
Candidate State Party Expenditures ($)
Grossman Arizona Democrat 111,224
Fannin Arizona Republican 87,470
Tunney California Democrat 556,225
Murphy California Republican 471,738
Chiles Florida Democrat 83,492
Cramer Florida Republican 216,064
Humphrey Minnesota Democrat 196,658
MacGregor Minnesota Republican 196,392
Ottinger New York Democrat 1,375,641
Goodell New York Republican 570,306
Buckley New York Conservative 516,512
Metzenbaum Ohio Democrat 507,627
Taft Ohio Republican 374,281
Gore Tennessee Democrat 214,636
Brock Tennessee Republican 209,461
Hearings on S. 1, S. 382, & S. 956 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the
Sen. Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., App. A, at 687-719 (1971) [herein-
after referred to as 1971 Hearings on S. 382].
5 V. KEY, POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GRouPS 534, 539 (1958).
6 H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE 1968 ELECTION 5 (1971). This 1968 figure
for broadcast expenditures at the presidential level is 2.2 times greater than comparable
figures for 1964. Id.
7 Id. at 56. Kennedy also spent approximately $360,000 on newspaper advertising
during these primaries.
8 Id. at 92. These figures consist of expenditures for actual time and space on tele-
vision and radio, media production costs and advertising agency fees.
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numbers of voters; and in the case of a presidential election, his
campaign must cover an expansive geographic area. Quite naturally,
television has become the most important medium available to the
politican.
According to one leading communications expert, television is a
medium for playing down the idea of issues and emphasizing the
celebrity image that is created.' Indeed, Marshall McLuhan has
severely criticized campaign analyst Theodore White for concentrat-
ing on the content of the Nixon-Kennedy debates, rather than the
image each man was presenting to the American public.'0 But
whether the candidate's image or his position on the campaign issues
is more important in television political advertising is of little sig-
nificance from a cost perspective: since the candidates themselves
believe that their image is critical, they invariably hire advertising
agencies and public relations experts to design and orchestrate their
media campaigns." Ever since the 1952 presidential election when
advertising agencies first came on the national political scene, the
use of these experts to project the candidate's desired public image
has become an indispensable function in an effective political cam-
paign. The important point, however, is that television communica-
tion has provided political campaigns with a powerful resource, and
the media expert has become an integral factor in its use. And, as
the above statistics illustrate, the optimal utilization of this resource
requires the outlay of vast sums of money.
B. Financing the Political Campaign
American political parties have relied solely upon private contri-
butions to finance candidates' campaigns. Given the large increase in
campaign spending - precipitated for the most part by the rising
use of mass media advertising - it is not hard to grasp the immense
financial burden presently facing political parties, or for that matter,
the individual candidate who wishes to campaign without strict al-
legiance to any party affiliation. Of necessity, political parties and
candidates are constantly searching for new sources of funds.
9 See generally M. MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF
MAN (1964).
10 Id. at 287-88. For White's analysis of the Nixon-Kennedy debates, see T. WHITE,
THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 1960,279-95 (1961).
11 Reports indicate that, in 1970, 26 candidates for senator or governor employed
media experts to manage their television advertising. TIME, Nov. 16, 1970, at 14. For
a general discussion of the use of media advertising in a political campaign, see J. Mc-
GINNIS, THE SELLING OF THE PRESIDENT 1968 (1969).
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It would seem that a continuing goal of both major political
parties would be to increase their number of contributors. Suc-
cinctly stated, the more people who contribute, the more money the
parties will have available to spend. For example, if everyone who
voted in the 1968 presidential election had given one dollar, the
campaigns of Nixon, Humphrey and Wallace could have been com-
pletely financed. 2 In practice, however, only a small percentage
of voters contribute to a political campaign. In order to stimulate
interest in the small contribution, Phillip L. Graham, publisher of
the Washington Post, suggested the use of nonpartisan national ad-
vertising to urge political contributions.3 The idea was adopted by
the Advertising Council of the American Heritage Foundation which
ran spot advertisements soliciting voters to contribute to the party of
their choice.
Although such nonpartisan appeals have occasionally been suc-
cessful on a small scale,14 the usual result is abysmal failure, which
has been explained by the lack of emotional bias which seems to
motivate contributions in partisan fund-raising campaigns. 5 Also,
12 Implicit in this premise is the assumption that the small contribution can be at-
tracted with relatively small expenses. This assumption may or may not be correct in a
particular situation. If the contributions are solicited by mailings, for example, the
costs of the operation may cancel out a major part of the contributions. Indeed, it has
been estimated that a national committee spends $250,000 on postage alone in a cam-
paign year. V. KEY, supra note 5, at 539.
13 Address by Phillip L. Graham, University of Chicago, School of Business, June 1,
1955.
14 One successful bipartisan campaign for contributions has been carried on by the
Aero-Jet General Corporation. Political contributions are withheld from employee's
pay, at their request, and between 1958 and 1968 Aero-Jet has raised almost half a
million dollars. Alexander, The Cost of Presidential Elections, in PRACTICAL POLITICS
IN THE UNITED STATES 284 (C. Cotter ed. 1969).
15 In 1964, two significant attempts at bipartisan fund raising were made. The R.
L. Polk & Co. plan sought individual contributions via letters to the general public
signed by Dwight Eisenhower and Adlai Stevenson, but the effort failed. The relative
absence of emotional bias (which is presumably greater with partisan pleas), and the
mere novelty of bipartisan pleas have been given as reasons for the failure of the
Eisenhower-Stevenson letter. Haydon & Daly, The "Eisenhower-Stevenson Appeal":
An Adventure in Bipartisan Political Fund Raising, in BIPARTISAN POLITICAL FUND
RAISING: Two ExPERIMENTs IN 1964) (A. Heard ed. 1966), cited in 2 STuDIEs IN
MONEY IN POLITICS 9, 17 (H. Alexander ed. 1966).
The second fund raising attempt was proposed by Neil Staebler, a former con-
gressman from Michigan, and adopted by the Michigan Center for Education in Politics.
The campaign was to take the form of a charity drive with door-to-door solicitation.
Saginaw, Michigan was selected as the test community because of its relative isolation
and the balance between the two political parties. Although substantial support was
obtained from community leaders, the campaign was unsuccessful. The solicitors re-
ceived only 372 contributions totaling $410.86. Once again the failure was attributed
to a fundamental need for partisanship in political appeals. Schutz, Community Bi-
partisan Political Fund Raising: An Exercise in Futility, in BIPARTISAN POLITICAL
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the small contributor can expect to exert little influence upon the
politician, whereas the large contributor can expect to have a greater
influence on and access to the politician's views and decision-
making.16 Thus, most attempts at expanding the base of political
contributions have been relatively unsuccessful.
In fact, from 1964 to 1968 the number of individual contrib-
utors declined by four million 7 7- perhaps because the major politi-
cal parties are unwilling, as much as unable, to generate a larger
number of small contributions. Yet the almost exclusive reliance of
the major political parties upon large contributions is not unjusti-
fied, for it is dearly easier and more efficient to obtain one 500
dollar contribution than 500 one dollar contributions.' 8 Such a
philosophy, however, raises serious problems that must be appre-
ciated in any analysis of campaign finance.' 9
FUND RAISING: Two ExPERIMENTs IN 1964 (A. Heard ed. 1966), cited in 2 STuDiEs
IN MONEY IN POLITCS 19-20, 26-27 (H. Alexander ed. 1966).
3-6 The direct access of the large contributors to political candidates cannot be under-
estimated. Well-heeled Harold Perlman, for example, wrote Senator Edmund Muskie
a letter stating that he was prepared to contribute $100,000 to Muskie and suggesting
a meeting later that week. When Perlman was informed by a Muskie aide that the
Senator would like to meet with him, Perlman simply replied, "I'm not surprised." The
meeting took place the next day and when Muskie later disclosed his campaign contrib-
utors, Perlman was listed as a $32,000 contributor. Pruden, Why Fat Cats Make Good
Political Pets, National Observer, April 8, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
-'7 Number of Contributors to Political Campaigns in Presidential Years.
Year Number of Contributors
1952 3 million
1956 & million
1960 10 million
1964 12 million
1968 8 million
H. ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 144. Alexander is unable to give any plausible ex-
planation for the decline in individual contributors in 1968.
18 Only three times since 1948 have the two major presidential candidates received
more than half of their contributions in amounts of less than $500.
Percent of Political Contributions
of $500 or more to Presidential Candidates
Year Democrats Republicans
1948 69% 74%
1952 63% 68%
1956 44% 74%
1960 59% 58%
1964 69% 28%
1968 61% 47%
The 1948-56 figures on political contributions are from A. HEARD, THE COSTS OF
DEMOcRACY 48, 51 (1956); the 1960 figures are from IL ALEXANDER, FINANCING
THE 1964 ELECTION 85 (1966); and the 1968 figures are from H. ALEXANDER, supra
note 6, at 163.
19 Fear of the impact of the large contribution is perhaps the most important reason
why campaign finance laws were enacted originally. Indeed, large contributions and
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Large individual political contributions usually seem to be in-
duced by several desires: the contributor seeks to influence the mak-
ing or administration of public policy;20 the contributor seeks to
elect public officials with values and preferences which promise a
sympathetic attitude toward his private interests ;21 or the contributor
seeks an appointment to a political or public service job.' Al-
though incidents establishing a conflict of interest between contri-
butions and private interests are far too numerous to be effectively
summarized, a few examples should illustrate the kind of favoritism
that occurs. In 1970, two large shipping lines were convicted of
violating the prohibition against corporate contributions to politi-
their critics have been part of the American political scene for many years. In the
presidential election of 1896, Republican entrepreneur Mark Hanna raised $10-15 mil-
lion from large corporations for the campaign of William McKinley. B. SAIT, AMERI-
CAN PARTIES AND ELECTIONS 644 (1942). In 1904 Democratic presidential candi-
date Alton B. Parker made a campaign issue out of the corporate financing of the Re-
publican party. Lambert, Corporate Political Spending and Campaign Finance, 40
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1035 (1965). Republican Theodore Roosevelt, elected over Parker in
1904, urged the enactment of campaign regulations in his yearly message to Congress.
Roosevelt stated that "all contributions by corporations to any political committee or for
any political purpose should be forbidden by law; directors should not be permitted to
use stockholders' money for such purposes, and moreover, a prohibition of this kind
would be, as far as it went, an effective method of stopping the evils aimed at in corrupt
practices acts." 40 CONG. REC. 96 (1905).
Professor Louise Overacker, one of the earliest scholars in the area of campaign
finance, stated that the primary reason to fear the large contribution is that "(t]he Amer-
ican public has a general belief that contributions and expenditures are morally suspect
and that unchecked election financing would lead to unfair pressure from monied inter-
ests." L. OVERACKER, MONEY IN ELECTIONS 197, 376 (1932).
2 0 F. SORAUF, POLITICAL PARTIES AND POLITICS 321 (1968). Senator John J.
McClellan (D., Ark.), in testimony before a congressional investigating committee in
1957, stated:
I don't think anybody that gave me a contribution ever felt he was buying my
vote or anything like that, but he certainly felt he had an entree to me to dis-
cuss things with me and I was under obligation at least to give him an audience
when he desired it ... V. KEY, supra note 5, at 563.
As early as 1924, politicians recognized the potential influence of large contributors.
In that year Senator William Borah stated that, "So long as political parties seeking
power or control of the government accept vast contributions from those who are in-
terested in matters of legislation or administration, you will have sinister and corrupt
and controlled government." E. SALT, supra note 19, at 647.
Senator Roman Hruska has stated that "conventions . . . are bought all the time by
the business community - and everyone.. knows it." NEwSWEEK, March 20, 1972,
at 33.
21 F. SORAUF, supra note 20, at 321.
22This system of political appointments to large contributors has existed almost
since the beginning of presidential elections. In 1968, Herbert Alexander studied 345
major Nixon appointees and found that 34 had contributed more than $500 each to the
1968 campaign. In sum, these individuals contributed $326,975, of which $325,975
was given to the Republicans. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 353-55.
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cal campaigns; 3 both lines had recently been awarded multimillion
dollar Government subsidies. 4  And in 1966, the Committee for
Action, a group of construction and paving contractors who opposed
certain legislation, gave $14,000 to the campaign of Senator Robert
Griffin, a leader in the opposition against such legislation. 5
While such examples are obviously not conclusive proof that
money in fact influences political decision-making, they aptly illus-
trate the potentially dangerous possibilities that exist when politicians
are forced to rely on large private donations to finance their elec-
tion campaigns. It would seem that the large contributor has at
least a built-in lobby with which to influence elected officials, as well
as a better opportunity to gain a political appointment. When the
candidate must rely more or less exclusively on the large contribu-
tion, it is a logical extension of such reliance that he in some way
repay his benefactor, or else lose his support in the next campaign.
Given this connection, it is not hard to realize why the general pub-
lic takes a moral dislike to large political contributions.
Senator Edward Kennedy has perhaps best stated the predica-
ment of the political candidate:
Without a source of outside wealth, [the candidate] faces the Hob-
son's choice of either a shoestring election campaign or reliance
2 3 Originally enacted as the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of Feb. 28, 1925, ch. 368,
tit. III, § 313, 43 Stat. 1074.
2 4 REPORT OF T TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON FINANCING
CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGNS, ELECTING CONGRESS, THE FINANCIAL DILEMMIA 49
(1970) [hereinafter cited as TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND REPORT]. The two shipping
lines were fined $50,000 each, which seems a small price to pay considering that, com-
bined, they received $36.4 million in Government subsidies.
2 5 D. PEARSON & J. ANDERSON, TiE CASE AGAINST CONGRESS 316 (1968). The
most recent charge of conflict of interest concerning campaign contributions involved
the case of international Telephone and Telegraph Corp. In 1969, Justice Department
Antitrust Chief Richard McLaren filed three separate suits against ITT, challenging three
corporate acquisitions as violating section 7 of the Clayton Antitrust Act [15 U.S.C. §
18 (1970)] which prohibits corporate mergers when they "substantially lessen competi-
tion or tend to create a monopoly." In 1971, a settlement was reached which allowed the
acquisition of the Hartford Fire Insurance Co., the biggest corporate merger in United
States history. At about the same time, it appears that ITT offered to underwrite up to
$400,000 of the costs of the 1972 Republican convention then scheduled for San Diego.
Allegations concerning a link between the antitrust settlement and the $400,000
underwriting arose from a memorandum supposedly written by ITT lobbyist Dita Beard.
and disclosed to syndicated columnist Jack Anderson. After the disclosure, Democrats
on the Senate Judiciary Committee turned the hearings on the nomination of Richard,
Kleindienst to Attorney General into a full-scale investigation of the ITT controversy.
With the Republicans' charge that the Democrats were exploiting the hearings for
political reasons and the Democrats' charge that the Republicans were attempting to,
cover up a political scandal, the ITT controversy caused a continual series of allegations
and denials, charges and countercharges. But whether or not there was a link between
the antitrust settlement and the convention pledge, the latter seems to be a dear viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970). See generally NEWswEEK, March 20, 1972, at 24.
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on a few large contributors. If he takes the shoestring route, he
faces the prospect of almost certain defeat. If he goes the route of
the larger contributors, he inevitably creates the sort of ambiguous
relationship in which he is obligated - or appears to be obligated
- to his wealthy supporters. 26
Indeed, the average political candidate, faced with escalating costs
and unable to sufficiently tap the small contributor, turns out of ne-
cessity to the large contributor.
II. THE REGULATION OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE
A. The Power to Regulate
Constitutionally, the Congress is empowered with broad author-
ity to enact legislation controlling the election of its members and to
prescribe such rules as are necessary to secure the fair and honest
conduct of those elections." As a result, the courts in the past have
not questioned Congress' power to set limitations on political contri-
butions and expenditures, to require various financial disclosures, and
to prohibit contributions from certain sources.28 In addition, Con-
gress would clearly seem to have the power to regulate presidential
elections.2 ' Nevertheless, the question remains whether there are
legitimate governmental interests which justify the exercise of these
powers.
Certainly the Congress has an interest in preserving its integrity
as well as that of its individual members. And any reasonable
regulation which attempts to reduce the possibility that congressmen
may be influenced by potentially harmful special interests, should not
be looked upon as an abuse of its power. As a corollary to this justi-
26 117 CONG. REC. 13297 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1971).
27 See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 4, which states that "It]he Times, Places and Manner of
holding elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by
the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations, except as to the Places of choosing senators." See also U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 5, which states that "[elach House shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of its own members .... "
2 8 See United States v. Brewers' Ass'n., 239 F. 163 (D. Pa. 1916), which enumer-
ates and discusses the various constitutional bases for the regulation of elections. See
also Burroughs & Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934), which held that Con-
gress had the power to safeguard elections by the enactment of appropriate legislation,
including the public disclosure of political contributions, as well as the names of contrib-
utors.
29 The power to regulate presidential elections can be derived from several sources.
Article II, section 1 of the Constitution, modified by the 12th amendment, clearly gives
Congress the power to regulate the procedures for selection of president and vice presi-
dent. Additionally, this power may be derived from Article I, Section 8, the commerce
clause, and from section 5 of the 14th amendment, which was used to uphold civil rights
voting legislation in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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fication, Congress has a legitimate interest in requiring its members
to make public disclosures as to their campaign finances. Further-
more, Congress has an interest in seeing that wealth does not be-
come a precondition to election to its membership. While this list
does not exhaust the possibilities, it should be sufficient to dispose of
any questions as to the general propriety of Congress' activity in
the area of political campaign finance regulation. Still, it must be
remembered that Congress' regulatory power may possibly be abused
- viz., where the putative campaign finance regulations are only of
token substance and nothing more than a self-serving guise for no
regulation at all. At that point, regulatory legislation would prob-
ably be constitutionally invalid.
B. Legislation Prior to the Federal Election Campaign Act
Federal campaign finance laws were embodied in sections 241-
56 of title 2 of the United States Code (Federal Corrupt Practices
Act), which was repealed by the Federal Election Campaign Act;-
and in sections 591-612 of title 18 of the United States Code (Elec-
tion and Political Activities Laws), which were amended and re-
pealed in part by the Federal Election Campaign Act.3 While
examining the substantive provisions of these laws and their atten-
dant problems, the reader should keep in mind several inquiries:
(1) did these laws provide candidates with a reasonable means of
financing increasing campaign costs; (2) or in the alternative, did
they provide a realistic method of limiting the amount of expendi-
tures; (3) did they protect the general public from the possible dan-
gers of special interest influence on elected officials; (4) did they
provide for adequate public disclosure; and (5) did they include
appropriate mechanisms to enforce effectively the substantive provi-
sions? Proceeding with such inquiries as a basis of analysis, it will
become readily apparent in which areas comprehensive reform was
needed.
In essence, the Federal Corrupt Practices Act,32 promulgated in
1925, contained six major provisions: (1) every political commit-
tee was required to have a chairman and a treasurer and keep an
account of all contributions and expenditures;33 (2) political com-
30 Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225, tit. IV, § 405.
3 1 Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225, tit. II, §§ 201-07.
32 Act of Feb. 28, 1925, 43 Stat. 1070.
33 2 U.S.C. § 242 (1970), repealed by Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225, tit.
IV, § 405.
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mittees were required to file this accounting with the Secretary of
the Senate or Clerk of the House of Representatives, 15 days before
and 30 days after the election; 4 (3) the Secretary of the Senate
and the Clerk of the House of Representatives were to hold these
accounts open for inspection;35 (4) Senate candidates were allowed
to spend $10,000 and House candidates $2,500, or each could spend
three cents times the number of voters in the last election, with a
Senate candidate not to exceed $25,000, and a House candidate
$5,000;'6 (5) a candidate could not directly or indirectly promise
an appointment or use of influence in return for support in his candi-
dacy;37 and (6) violations of any of these provisions were punish-
able by a $10,000 fine and two years imprisonment. 8 The Federal
Corrupt Practices Act was oriented primarily towards a system of
public financial disclosure, but it also attempted to limit the amount
of money a congressional candidate could spend. Yet the maximum
allowable expenditures were grossly unrealistic; and as we shall see
later, they were easily circumvented.
The Election and Political Activities Laws were directed at the
political contribution, and they contained, among other less salient
provisions, three significant restrictions: (1) one who directly or in-
directly contributed more than $5,000 in one year to a candidate for
federal office or to a national committee would be fined not more than
$5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both; 9 (2) no
political committee could receive contributions of more than
$3,000,000 or spend more than $3,000,000 in one year;4° and (3)
national banks, corporations and labor unions were prohibited from
contributing to any federal election.4' Again, the maximum contri-
34 Id. § 246, repealed by Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225, tit. IV, § 405.
35 Id. § 247, repealed by Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225, tit. IV, § 405.
36 Id. § 248, repealed by Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225, tit. IV, § 405.
37 Id. § 249, repealed by Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225, tit. IV, § 405. A
similar provision remains embodied in 18 U.S.C. § 600 (1970), as amended by Act of
Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225, tit. II, § 202.
38 2 U.S.C. § 252 (1970), repealed by Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225, tit.
IV, § 405.
S9 18 U.S.C. § 608 (1970), as amended by Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225,
tit. II, §§ 201, 203.
40 Id. § 609, repealed by Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225, tit. II, § 204.
41 Id. § 610, as amended by Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225, tit. II, §§ 201,
205. Several prosecutions arose under this section, which stated that:
It is unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organized by
authority of any law of Congress, to make a contribution or expenditure in con-
nection with any election to any political office, or in connection with any pri-
mary election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any
political office, or for any corporation whatever, or any labor organization to
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bution ceiling of $5,000 immediately strikes one as unrealistic in
view of common knowledge regarding individual political contri-
butions. But as one would expect, this provision, as well as the pro-
hibition against contributions by corporations and labor unions, was
quite easily circumvented and violations were rarely, if ever, prose-
cuted.
It should be noted. that Congress has the inherent, constitutional
power to investigate the election of its own members.42  But effec-
tive congressional enforcement is virtually a dead issue. 4 Most
members of Congress ignore the existence of campaign finance laws,
let alone take action for failures to comply with them. Thus, the
enforcement of these laws is ultimately vested with the Justice De-
partment via the criminal sanctions attached to the violation of a pro-
vision. Once the Justice Department has knowledge of a violation,
it has the discretion, as in aniy other criminal charge, to prosecute
or not. But under the statutory scheme of the Federal Corrupt Prac-
tices Act and the Election and Political Activities Laws, there existed
no formal procedure for reporting violations to the Justice Depart-
ment. While the Federal Corrupt Practices Act did require candi-
dates to file statements containing certain information relating to
campaign contributions and expenditures with designated congres-
sional officials, there was no statutory duty on such officials to re-
port any violations to the Justice Department.44
Presumably, any person could complain to the Justice Depart-
ment about a potential violation. But this did not facilitate effec-
make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election at which
Presidential and Vice Presidential electors or a Senator or Representative in,
or a Delegate or Resident'Commissioner to Congress are to be voted for, or in
connection with any primary election or political convention or caucus held'
to select candidates for any of the foregoing offices, or for any candidate, polit-
ical committee, or other person to accept or receive any contribution prohibited
by this section. Id.
42 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
43 The last serious congressional challenge based on excessive and illegal campaign
expenditures was in 1927 when the Reid Committee investigated the election of Wil-
liam S. Vare of Pennsylvania to the House of Representatives. TWENTETH CENTURY
FUND REPORT, supra note 24, at 48.
In 1960, for example, 14 Senate and 65 House candidates filed no statements
whatsoever - a dear violation. Yet the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the
House took no action. During that same year, the Secretary of the Senate told Senator
Maurine Neuberger, who had filed an itemized statement of her expenses, that such de-
tail was unnecessary. 1971 Hearings on S. 382, supra note 4, at 454 (statement of
Philip M. Stern).
44 2 U.S.C. §§ 244-45 (1970), repealed by Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225,
tir. IV, § 405.
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tive enforcement because the minimal disclosure requirements re-
duced the amount of available information, and the Justice Depart-
ment retained total discretion as to prosecution. Indeed, it was this
discretion in a highly political area of the law which made the Jus-
tice Department ineffective in enforcing the campaign finance laws.45
The ease with which the law and its enforcement was circum-
vented can be shown by an incident which occurred in the mid-1960's.
As indicated earlier, the Election and Political Activities Laws pro-
hibited corporations from contributing to any federal election cam-
paign. " Under an Internal Revenue Ruling, however, corporations
advertising in the official program of a national political convention
were allowed a deduction as an ordinary and necessary business ex-
pense.4 7 The Government deemed any such advertising expenditure
outside the prohibition against corporate contributions (and hence
deductible) if: the amount of advertising was reasonable; the adver-
tisement was directly related to the advertiser's business and was
within the advertising value of the space required; and the proceeds
from the advertisement were used only to pay for the convention.
In 1964, the Democrats took advantage of this revenue ruling
in financing their $2 million national convention in Atlantic City48
by selling 96 full-page advertisements in their convention program
45 In 1968 the Clerk of the House notified the Justice Department about reporting
violations by a number of presidential committees. Although supplemental reports
correcting the violations were filed late, the Justice Department took no action. Indeed,
there has never been a prosecution under the Federal Corrupt Practices Act. Similarly,
between 1925 and 1969, there have been only a few prosecutions under the Elections
and Political Activities Laws (all of which centered on section 610, which prohibits
contributions by corporations, banks and labor unions). In 1969, however, the Justice
Department indicted 14 corporations for violations of section 610. All of the indict-
ments arose out of an investigation by the Internal Revenue Service of Howfield, Inc.,
a Los Angeles advertising firm which was a conduit for direct contributions by corpora-
tions. See TwENTIETH CENTURY FUND REPORT, supra note 24, at 48-50. Thus, de-
spite the recent flurry of prosecutions under section 610, the campaign finance laws are
still virtually unenforced.
Following both the 1960 and 1968 presidential elections, the president named
his campaign manager as Attorney General. And during testimony before the subcom-
mittee hearings on the Campaign Reform Bill, then Deputy Attorney General Richard
Kleindienst admitted that even-handed enforcement of these laws is extremely difficult.
Hearings on S. 1121 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Sen. Comm. on
Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 522 (1971) [hereinafter referred to as 1971 Hearings
on S. 1121]. Kleindienst later blamed lack of enforcement on weakness in the present
law, especially in the area of administrative provisions. Hearings on S. 382 Before
the Subcomm. on Privileges & Elections of the Sen. Comm. on Rules & Administration,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1971).
46 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970), as amended by Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225,
tit. II, §§ 201, 205.
4 7 Rev. Rul. 343, 1956-2 CUM. BULL. 115.
4 8 H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE 1964 ELECTIONS 40 (1966).
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at a price of $15,000 per ad. The revenue from these advertise-
ments (plus some support from other sources) produced a total in
excess of the cost of the convention.4  Republican Senator John J.
Williams asked the Internal Revenue Service to investigate the dis-
position of this excess of funds, but he was told that the amounts
spent by the corporations for advertisements were reasonable and
that the Internal Revenue Service was not interested in how the ex-
cess was spent.5" Williams then turned to the Justice Department,
alleging a violation of the prohibition against corporate contribu-
tions, but was told that the "facts ...do not demonstrate a viola-
tion." 51  Buoyed by the 1964 results, the Democrats published a
booklet in late 1965, Toward an Age of Greatness, filled with more
$15,000 per page corporate advertisements. Even though the dis-
tortion between advertising billing price and circulation indicated a
violation, and despite the statements of several Democratic congress-
man that they would use the funds in their campaigns, the Justice
Department took no action.52
Generally, then, the Justice Department is largely ineffective as
the enforcement agency for campaign finance laws because of its close
proximity to the electoral process. No administration is likely to
vigorously enforce the campaign finance laws against its own party
membership, nor will they enforce them against the other party for
fear of reciprocal treatment when party control changes. In such a
situation, where enforcement is almost nonexistent, the substantive
provisions contained in any system of campaign finance regulation
become meaningless. Clearly, any solution relying on governmental
enforcement requires that the body charged with enforcement be
49Id. at 101.
50 Id.
5 1Letter from Fred M. Vinson, Jr. (Assistant U.S. Attorney General) to Senator John
J. Williams (D., Del.), 112 CONG. REc. 1240 (1966).
52 Neal Peirce found that Toward at; Age of Greatness had approximately 250,000
readers. He reported that the cost per thousand distributions of these ads was $60 as
compared to $5 for Time magazine. Peirce, Financing Our Parties, THE REPORTER,
Feb. 10, 1966, at 29, 32, 34.
The $700,000 received by the Democrats from Toward an Age of Greatness has
been held in escrow until recently while it was decided what to do with the money.
The lawyers advising the Democrats convinced them that the scheme was so dubious
that the money should not be used to pay any partisan obligations. Instead, the money
is to be used for nonpartisan voter education and registration. N.Y. Times, April 13,
1972, at 35, col. 1. Still, the fact that this money is apparently going to nonpartisan
purposes should not exonerate the corporate advertisers. Their intention at the time
the money was paid to the Democrats is determinative of their guilt or innocence under
federal law, and the original intention points strongly to partisan contributions.
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politically autonomous, thereby removing the pressures which ren-
dered past legislation impotent.ta
Along with the inadequacy of enforcement mechanisms, the fail-
ure of previous legislation is also attributable to its poor drafting.
Then President Johnson - certainly one who is knowledgeable about
corruption in politics - stated that "current regulations of campaign
finance are more loophole than law." 54  And the formula for cam-
paign spending which limited Senate candidates to $25,000 and House
candidates to $5,000, 5 was written in 1925 when the front-porch
campaign was still feasible and when radio was in its first decade.
The spending limitation of $3 million by political committees56 was
an arbitrary standard, which failed to take into account inflationary
cost increases. No doubt, these spending limitations were completely
unrealistic in the current era of crosscountry, mass-media political
campaigns.
Fortunately for the candidates, however, there were sufficient
loopholes in the campaign finance laws. to allow easy avoidance of
these restrictions. For example, the definition of a political commit-
tee applied only to those committees which operated in two or more
states,57 so a candidate could set up committees on a one-state level
and avoid the $3,000,000 committee spending restriction. Individual
contributors could also bypass the $5,000 limit on contributions 58
53 One suggestion is to charge the Comptroller General with the enforcement powers.
Because of his long-term appointment, he would be relatively isolated from partisan
political pressure. Alexander, Money, Politics and Public Reporting, STUJDIES IN
MONEY IN POLITICS 60 (H. Alexander ed. 1962).
Alexander, Director of the Citizens' Research Foundation, has also recommended
the creation of a Registry of Election Finance to be located in the Library of Congress.
The Registry would set up a filing system and publish reports - although it would have
no investigatory powers - and would be supervised by the Senate and House Commit-
tees on Rules and Administration. Id. at 63-65.
The most recent proposal, arising from the Kennedy Commission study and the
Twentieth Century Fund proposals, suggests the establishment of a bipartisan Federal
Elections Commission which would set up rules and regulations and also have investi-
gatory powers. See generally TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND REPORT, supra note 24.
54 S. JouR 227 (May 26, 1966) (message of President Johnson to Congress).
5 2 U.S.C. § 248 (1970), repealed by Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225, tit.
IV, § 405.
56 18 U.S.C. § 609 (1970), repealed by Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225,
tit. II, § 204.
57 18 U.S.C. § 591 (1970), as amended by Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225,
tit. II, § 201. The law stated that, "[t~he term 'political committee' includes any com-
mittee, association, or organization which accepts contributions or makes expenditures
for the purpose of influencing or attempting to influence the election of candidates or
presidential and vice presidential electors . . .in two or more States ... (emphasis
added).
58The following figures illustrate how the prohibition in 18 U.S.C. § 608 (1970)
against contributions in excess of $5,000 was totally ineffective.
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
by giving to several different committees supporting the same candi-
date or by making contributions through willing relatives. Further,
if the contributor gave only to state-level committees which were ex-
empted from reporting, he was able to hide all of his contributions."
While all of this legal deception was taking place, the candidate,
who was also required to file -a report of his expenditures, 60 was pre-
sumed to be innocent of the activities of these state-level committees
and groups which were operating in his behalf." Regrettably, the
candidates had no choice but to use such evasive schemes; because
the legislative restrictions and prohibitions governing campaign con-
tributions were so patently unrealistic.
Another example of poor drafting is the prohibition against
contributions by corporations and labor unions.62 " Althofgh -corpo-
rations, were prohibited from making- direct contributions, -they were
able to contribute indirectly to the candidate of their choice. Con-
tributions took the form of individual solicitation of high corporate
officials, partisan advertising, and contributions to corporate .political
action committees.' These business committees were supported by
voluntary contributions from individuals and corporations. The
Political Contributions in
Excess of $10,000 from 1952-1968
Number of
Year Individual Contributors Total Contributions ($)
1952 110 1,936,870
1956 111 2,300,000
1960 95 1,552,009
1964 130 2,161,905'
1968 424 12,187,863
H. ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 167.
509 Perhaps the most glaring example of the use of "dummy" state-level committees
to hide the identity of contributors is provided by the 1970 Senate campaign of James
Buckley (R., N.Y.). By the use of committees such as the League of Middle American
Women and the Committee to Keep a Cop on the Beat, Buckley was able to hide the
identity of persons contributing $400,000 to his campaign. David R. Jones, the Buckley
campaign manager, summed up the role of these dummy committees in his statement
that "we made a game out of it." "False Front" Campaign Funds: How They Work,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 11, 1971, at 57.
60 2 U.S.C. § 246 (1970), repealed by Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225, tit.
IV, § 405.
61 Senator Gravel (D., Alas.) identified the truth when he said: "[We are techni-
cally violating the laws because we have knowledge of these great sums being spent on
our behalf." 1971 Hearings on S. 382, supra note 4, at 156.
62 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970), as amended by Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225,
tit. II, §§ 201, 205.
63 Lambert, supra note 19, at 1039.
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funds were then channeled to selected candidates, thus allowing the
corporation a convenient way to make a "legal" contribution.6"
Moreover, labor (and presumably corporations) was permitted
to endorse candidates in its publications and to use voluntary funds
in partisan broadcasts to the public.65  Still, as was true for corpora-
tions, the political action committee was used as the conduit for the
bulk of labor's political contributions.66 Thus, while millions of
dollars were channeled indirectly to candidates by labor unions and
corporations, only those who carelessly made direct contributions
were ever penalized.
III. THE ROAD TO REFORM
While numerous reform programs have been proposed by both
legislators and private interests,67 no constructive reform legislation
64 In 1968 it was reported that more than $2 million was spent by business or pro-
fessional committees. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 201. In addition to the large
contributions from the political committees, Alexander reports that the officers and
directors of the 25 largest defense and industrial companies contributed nearly $1.5
million in 1968. Id. at 186.
65 Such endorsements did not violate 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970) as long as they were
part of regular union activities and were based upon voluntary contributions. United
States v. Anchorage Central Labor Council, 193 F. Supp. 504 (D. Alas. 1961); United
States v. C.I.O., 77 F. Supp. 355 (D.D.C. 1948).
06 Labor National-Level Committees' Gross Disbursements
Year Reporting Committees Gross Disbursements ($)
1956 17 2.2 million
1960 21 2.3 million
1964 31 3.7 million
1968 37 7.1 million
H. ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 194
67 Shortly after he took office in 1961, President Kennedy appointed a Commission
on Campaign Costs to examine the problem of campaign finance. The following year
the commission recommended the following major actions, among others: (1) enact-
ment of tax deductions for expenditures in connection with voluntary bipartisan politi-
cal activities; (2) enactment of income tax credits and deductions for certain contribu-
tions to national parties and designated state committees; (3) establishment of a Registry
of Election Finance to which all committees, parties or groups spending $2500 or more
would be required to report; (4) repeal of 18 U.S.C. § 608 (1970), which places a ceiling
on individual contributions; (5) repeal of 18 U.S.C. § 609 (1970), which places a ceiling
on receipts and expenditures by political committees; (6) strict enforcement of all cam-
paign finance statutes; (7) development of modern fund-raising practices; (8) encourage-
ment of research techniques on campaign efficiency; (9) public subsidization of the
presidential transition period; and (10) suspension of section 315 of the Federal Com-
munications Act of 1934 [47 U.S.C. § 315 (a) (1970)] which requires broadcast media
to give free time equally to all candidates when one candidate receives free time. Alex-
ander, The Cost of Presidential Elections, in PRACTICAL POLITICS IN THE UNITED
STATES 308-10 (C. Cotter ed. 1969).
Another reform proposal came in 1962 from prominent Washington, D.C. attorney,
Philip Stern. Stern proposed a system partially based on funding of campaigns through
the U.S. Treasury. In Presidential years, the two National Committees would receive
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had been enacted until 1971. Although suggested improvements
and alternative proposals have been many, they have had some com-
bination of several familiar concepts in common: (1) the expansion
of the base of political contributions to provide an additional source
of funds, thereby reducing the reliance on the large contribution;
(2) the implementation of realistic ceilings on expenditures; (3)
prohibitions on contributions from certain sources that present a
danger of conflicts of interest; (4) more accurate public disclosure
of the source and application of funds; and (5) the effective en-
forcement of substantive provisions.
Many reform plans have involved innovative schemes for imple-
menting the above concepts. In recent years, for example, the idea
of public subsidization of federal elections has been strongly advo-
cated.68 By many, the idea of public subsidization - with its cen-
10 cents for each vote cast in the last election, with minor party candidates to be al-
loted one-fourth as much. Candidates for Congress would receive 20 cents for each
vote cast in the last congressional election. Stern also suggested a tax credit and aboli-
tion of the ceiling on private contributions over $100. In a rather novel approach to the
partisan enforcement problem, Stern advocated the use of retired federal judges to ad-
minister the program. Stem, A Cure for Political Fund-raising, HARPER'S, May, 1962,
at 59, 62-63.
In 1968, the Committee for Economic Development proposed a system of campaign
finance reform. The committee recommended a tax credit of 50 percent of the contribu-
tion (with a credit limit of $25 per taxpayer), stringent disclosure requirements, strict
enforcement of 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970), repeal of all ceilings on spending and contribu-
tions, and repeal of the equal-time provision in § 315(a) of the Federal Communications
Act of 1934 [47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970)]. THE COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DE-
VELOPMENT, FINANCING A BETTER ELECTION SYSTEM 21-25 (1968).
The most recent reform program has come from the Twentieth Century Fund, a non-
profit and nonpartisan organization endowed by Edward A. Filene. The Fund has rec-
ommended several reform proposals, including- (1) full disclosure, requiring any com-
mittee raising or spending more than $1,000 a year to report; (2) creation of a Federal
Elections Commission to audit and publicize the financial reports; (3) repeal of all
statutory spending limitations; (4) repeal of the limits on the size of individual contribu-
tions; (5) vigorous enforcement of section 610 of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act; and
(6) centralization of finance under one official campaign committee. TWENTIETH CEN-
TURY FUND REPORT, supra note 20, at 15-21. While none of these programs has been
translated into specific legislation, they have succeeded in stimulating public interest in
the need for the reform of existing campaign finance laws, and some of the proposals
contained therein are incorporated in reform legislation yet to be discussed.
It is interesting to note that most of these reform programs have come from individ-
uals or organizations isolated from political pressure. This further illustrates the belief
that politicians are reluctant to police themselves. Congress, however, has at various
times held hearings on campaign finance reform. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 219 Before
the Special Sen. Comm. to Investigate Political Activities, Lobbying and Campaign
Contributions, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); S. REP. No. 176, 85th Con&, 1st Sess.
(1957); S. REP. No. 101, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945); S. REP. No. 47, 77th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1941).
68 See generally the programs referred to in note 67 supra.
Puerto Rico is the only American jurisdiction where elections are partially subsi-
dized by the public. In Puerto Rico, each party may draw up to $75,000 in a nonelec-
tion year and $150,000 in an election year. For a complete examination of the system
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tral theme of expanding the base of contributions - has been
deemed a cure-all for the ills presently affecting campaign finance.
Differing motives may control a particular proponent of this kind of
plan; i.e., the candidate seeks additional sources of money, and the
reformer hopes to prevent the political pressure of potentially harm-
ful special interests by decreasing the need to rely on the large con-
tribution. But regardless of motive, the end result of public sub-
sidization seems to be that the interests of both candidate and re-
former will be satisfied. And if the subsidization provisions are
joined with realistic spending restrictions, the politician's burden
will be reduced to an even greater degree, entirely eliminating the
reliance on the large contribution.
In its purest form, public subsidization would involve the federal
funding of congressional and presidential election campaigns from
the Government's general funds. The more popular forms of sub-
sidization, however, are the tax credit and the tax deduction."' A tax
credit would allow the voting taxpayer to take a certain amount of
money from his final liability and earmark it for political contribu-
tion, while the tax deduction would allow the political contribution
to be subtracted from taxable income. Several states have presently
adopted some form of the tax credit or tax deduction for their re-
spective state income taxes."
On December 10, 1971 the Presidential Election Campaign Fund
Act7 - signed into law as part of the Revenue Act of 1971 -
created a new plan of public subsidization for presidential elections
of public subsidization in Puerto Rico, see Wells, Government Financing of Political
Parties in Puerto Rico, in STUDIES IN MONEY IN POLITICS 7 (H. Alexander ed. 1962).
One plan of public subsidization created by Senator Russell Long (D., La.) did catch
congressional fancy for a short time. In late 1966, Congress enacted the Presidential
Election Campaign Fund Act, 31 U.S.C. § 971 (1970). Under this plan, each tax-
payer could designate one dollar of his federal income tax to go into the fund. The
money would have been split by the Democrats and Republicans. In 1967, however, the
Act was amended to provide that funds be disbursed only after adoption by law of guide-
lines governing distribution. Act of June 13, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-26, 81 Star. 58.
See generally 23 CoNG. Q. ALMANAc 286 (1967). Guidelines were never promul-
gated and the operable provisions of the Act were recently repealed. Act of Dec. 10,
1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, tit. VIII, § 802 (b) (1), repealing Act of Nov. 13, 1966, Pub.
L. No. 89-809, tit. III, §§ 303, 304, 305.
6 9 See generally the proposals of the Kennedy Commission, the Committee for Eco-
nomic Development, and Philip Stem in note 67 supra.
7 0 See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE § 17234 (West 1968) (which allows a tax de-
duction of up to $100 a year for political contributions); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.21
(3)(e)(1) (1961) (which allows a personal deduction for contributions up to $100).
71 Act of Dec. 10, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, §§ 9001-13. The p!an is similar to the
earlier plan devised by Senator Long which passed Congress in 1966, but was repealed
in 1967. See note 68 supra.
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to take effect in 1973.72 The new legislation, commonly known as
Tax Checkoff, allows a taxpayer to designate one dollar of his yearly
tax to be paid over to the Presidential Election Campaign Fund.73
From this fund, eligible candidates74 from "major parties"75 can re-
ceive payments equal to 15 cents multiplied by the number of U.S.
residents over 18 on June 1st of the year preceding a presidential elec-
tion year. 0 A "minor party" candidate77 would be entitled to receive
a similar sum based on the number of votes received by the party's
candidate in the last presidential election. 78  In addition, new politi-
cal parties and other parties that failed to receive enough votes to
qualify as a minor party are eligible for certain payments.7 "
Had Tax Checkoff been law in the 1968 election, and had the
principal candidates opted to utilize public subsidization, the Demo-
cratic and Republican presidential candidates would have received
$20.4 million each, and George Wallace would have received $6.3
million.80
72 Act of Dec. 10, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, tit. VIII, § 9013. The Tax Checkoff
plan will not apply to the 1972 presidential election, primarily because of political facts
surrounding its introduction and passage. The idea arose from a Democratic party
meeting on July 14, 1971. See The Plain Dealer (Cleveland, Ohio), Dec. 10, 1971,
at 14, col. 1. The Democrats were still deep in debt from the 1968 election and were
expected to have a problem raising campaign funds; whereas the Republicans already
had a campaign surplus and, with an incumbent in the White House, a substantial
advantage in attracting additional contributions. See The Washington Evening Star,
Dec. 3, 1971, at A-6, col. 1. The application of Tax Checkoff to the 1972 election
would allow the Democrats to erase the Republican advantage.
The Democrats tied Tax Checkoff to the Revenue Act of 1971, feeling that the
President would not veto such an integral part of his economic program. Nevertheless,
repeated veto threats forced a compromise and an effective date of January 1, 1973.
Even then, the applicability of Tax Checkoff to the 1976 election is far from certain:
sources indicate that President Nixon will attempt a repeal of the provision. See The
Washington Post, Dec. 3, 1971, at 1, col. 8.
It seems ironic, albeit not surprising, that legislation designed to remove presi-
dential campaign finance from the arena of politics should be motivated by such parti-
san desires. It does, however, point to the desperate need of candidates and political
parties for funds.
73 Act of Dec. 10, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, tit. VIII, § 9006.
74ld. § 9002(4).
75Id. § 9002(6) (which defines a "major party" as "a political party whose candi-
date for the office of President in the preceding presidential election received, as the
candidate of such party, 25 percent or more of the total number of popular votes re-
ceived by all candidates for such office").
761d. § 9004(a)(1).
77 Id. § 9002(7) (which defines a "minor party" as "a political party whose candi-
date for the office of President in the preceding presidential election received, as the
candidate of such party, 5 percent or more but less than 25 percent of the total number
of popular votes received by all candidates for such office").
781d. § 900 4 (a)(2).
79ld. § 9004(a)(3).
80 These figures are taken from an article on the Tax Checkoff plan in The Plain
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In its present form, Tax Checkoff contains a number of problems
which will limit its effectiveness as a comprehensive plan of cam-
paign finance reform: (1) it is limited to the presidential election;
(2) it is applicable only to expenditures incurred within a period
commencing on the date a major party nominates its candidate at
its national convention and ending 30 days after the election,"' and
thus contains no restrictions on the amount of money a candidate may
spend in attaining the nomination; and (3) its funding base, the
designation of one dollar of yearly tax, is completely optional with
the taxpayer.
The plan also will probably encourage splinter parties and an
increase in the number of presidential candidates."' Whether this is
a desired effect depends on one's political philosophy, but Tax Check-
off certainly provides a better opportunity for a candidate with lim-
ited financial support to campaign for the presidency. In addition,
because Tax Checkoff provides the candidate with a new source of
funds, it might reduce his reliance on the large contribution. But
such an effect is less than certain because the candidate or party must
still be able to absorb all the campaign costs incurred prior to the
commencement of the period when he begins to benefit from Tax
Checkoff.
If a candidate is to benefit under the plan, he and his authorized
committees must certify to the Comptroller General that they will
not incur qualified campaign expenses in excess of the aggregate
payments he is entitled to, and that no contribution to defray quali-
fied expenses will be accepted, unless the Checkoff fund is insuf-
ficient to cover them.83  This provision thus places a ceiling on cam-
paign expenditures during the period when the candidate receives
Dealer (Cleveland, Ohio), Nov. 23, 1971, at 3, col. 1. Under section 9006(a), the Secre-
tary of the Treasury is to establish a separate account for each political party and make
payments into these accounts after certification by the Comptroller General under sec-
tion 9005(a). Prior to certification, the Comptroller General must examine the records
furnished by the candidates who are seeking Tax Checkoff funds. In addition, after each
presidential election, the Comptroller General is required by section 9007 to make a
thorough audit of each candidate to ensure that the party: (1) did not incur expenses
in excess of the allotment allowed by section 9004; (2) did not accept contributions in
addition to Tax Checkoff; and (3) did not use the payments for other than campaign
expenses. If violations are found, the Comptroller General must demand appropriate re-
payments. Act of Dec. 10, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, tit. VIII, § 9007 (b).
811d. § 9002(12).
82 A small party could not receive payments from the fund and then not use the
money for campaign expenses, because the Comptroller General must audit the expenses
after each presidential election and demand repayment if the money is not used for cam-
paign expenses. Id. § 9007(a)-(b).
831d. § 9003(b)-(c).
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the Tax Checkoff funds - a period when a candidate's media ex-
penses are at their peak. It is unlikely, however, that this limita-
tion would significantly impede a candidate since it is at least high
enough to permit continued spending at present levels.
Tax Checkoff also provides for a comprehensive system of finan-
cial disclosure administered by the Comptroller General's office. The
eligible candidates must submit to the Comptroller General periodic,
detailed statements as to the qualified expenses incurred by them and
their authorized committees.8 4  At a reasonable time after the elec-
tion, the Comptroller General must submit a full report to the Senate
and House of Representatives.8 5  In addition, he is authorized to
prescribe such rules and regulations, to conduct such examinations
and audits, to conduct such investigations, and to require the keeping
and submission of such books, records and information as are neces-
sary to carry out his function." In vesting the Comptroller General
with the administration of the plan's substantive provisions, Congress
has alleviated many of the problems associated with the self-policing
mechanisms of prior legislation.
Another major attribute of the plan lies in its enforcement mech-
anism, especially with respect to those who have standing to allege
a violation. The Comptroller General, the national committee of
any political party, and individuals eligible to vote in presidential
elections are authorized to institute actions in the district courts to
implement any provision of the law.8 7 This broad grant of standing
goes a long way towards creating effective enforcement and obviat-
ing the problems of partisanship which existed under previous legis-
lation that authorized only the Justice Department to bring suit.
Regarding any certification, determination or other action by the
Comptroller General, any interested person has the right to the judi-
cial review of such action in the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia. 8 The act also provides criminal sanctions for viola-
84 1d. § 9008.
85Id. § 9009(a).
861d. § 9009(b).
87Id. § 9011(b)(1) (which states: "[tthe Comptroller General, the national com-
mittee of any political party, and individuals eligible to vote for President are author-
ized to institute such actions, including actions for declaratory judgment or injunctive
relief, as may be appropriate to implement or construe any provision of this chapter.") It
appears from this that any individual bringing suit would have available a broad scope
of remedies, possibly including damages or even an injunction to prevent an elected
official from taking office.
881d. § 9011(a).
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tions of various substantive provisions. 9 The important point, how-
ever, is that the enforcement provisions are no longer mere placebo.
The Tax Checkoff plan is undoubtedly a major step towards re-
forming the entire area of campaign finance legislation. Nonethe-
less, it was never intended to be a comprehensive overhaul of exist-
ing legislation, and in fact, most likely owes its existence to the need
of the Democrats to work out some means to facilitate their cam-
paign financing and their tactical ploy of tieing the proposal to legis-
lation which the President would not veto. °
Almost buried by the controversy over Tax Checkoff is a signifi-
cant improvement in campaign finance legislation. Title VII of the
Revenue Act of 1971 provides for limited tax credits and deductions.
An individual taxpayer is allowed a credit against his tax of up to
$12.501 or, in the alternative, a deduction of up to $50.00. 2  These
provisions, applicable to the 1972 elections,98 have the potential to
expand the contribution base by providing an incentive to the small
contributor. In practice, however, the effect of these tax incentives
will be minimal unless they receive more media coverage, because the
taxpayer will be unaware of the various options available to him.
IV. THE CAMPAIGN ACT OF 1971
Finally, after considerable legislative manipulation, President
Nixon signed into law the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 4
89 Id. § 9012.
9
oSee note 72 supra.
9 1 Act of Dec. 10, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, tit. VII, §§ 41(a), (b)(1).
92 Id. § 218.
931d. § 703.
9 4 Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225. The legislative path of the Federal
E'ection Campaign Act of 1971 took well over a year from introduction to enactment.
The actual beginning of Senate Bill 382 stems from the veto of Senate Bill 3637 by
President Nixon on October 12, 1970. 6 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOCUMENTS 1367.
Senate Bill 3637 permanently suspended the equal time requirement of section 315(a}
of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 [47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970) (originally
enacted as Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, tit. III, § 315, 48 Stat. 1088) ] which, for pres-
idential campaigns required broadcast stations to charge candidates at their own estab-
lished lowest unit rate for comparable commercial time; and placed a ceiling on the-
amount of money candidates for federal elective office, the offices of governor or lieu-
tenant governor, or anyone on their behalf could spend for radio and television time.
President Nixon vetoed this bill, calling for more comprehensive reform in the area of
campaign finance, rather than a bill dealing only with media advertising.
Early in January 1971, several campaign reform bills were introduced in the Sen-
ate. During the March hearings, the major controversies concerned the possibility of
repealing the equal time requirement of the Federal Communications Act of 1934, the
need for a spending limitation, and the proper mechanism for public disclosure. On
August 5, 1971, the Senate passed Senate Bill 382 by a vote of 88 to 2 which repealed
the equal time requirement with respect to presidential and vice presidential candidate
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which - in addition to establishing new substantive provisions -
repealed the Federal Corrupt Practices Act and repealed or amended
certain sections of the Election and Political Activities Laws. The
act is unique in that it is the first piece of legislation attempting a
comprehensive overhaul of the campaign finance laws. While it con-
tains numerous provisions, the Campaign Act is primarily directed
at campaign expenditures, especially those involving the various com-
munications mediaY5 The act is structured in four parts: Title I
requires that broadcast stations give reduced rates to legally quali-
fied candidates and establishes an aggregate ceiling on a candidate's
expenditures; Title II is a series of amendments to the Election and
Political Activities Laws, including limitations on expenditures from
the candidates' personal funds, a repeal of the maximum contribu-
tion and expenditure restrictions, and a strengthening of the prohibi-
tion on contributions by national banks, corporations and labor
unions; Title III is original legislation establishing a detailed system
in both primary and general elections, and set a spending limitation of five cents times
the number of potential votes for broadcast advertising and an equal amount for non-
broadcast advertising. Senate Bill 382 also delegated enforcement of the disclosure re-
quirements to an independent Federal Elections Commission, composed of members ap-
pointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate for relatively long
terms.
Just as the House was to take up this campaign reform bill, the bitter partisan con-
troversy surrounding Tax Checkoff forced its postponement, thus precluding enactment
until December when the House passed a bill significantly different from the Senate-
passed bill. The House-passed bill failed to include any repeal of the equal time re-
quirement and divided the disclosure duties with the Clerk of the House, the Secretary
of the Senate, and the Comptroller General rather than the Federal Elections Commis-
sion. In the Senate-House conference, the Senate receded on both of these major provi-
sions, indicating that the Federal Election Campaign Act would be substantially weaker
than the Senate-passed bill.
The major reason for the failure to repeal section 315(a) was that President Nixon
threatened a veto unless the repeal was extended to all candidates for federal office, rather
than just President and Vice president. Congress, probably unwilling to give free air
time to their lesser known opponents, decided that the best course was to leave section
315(a) intact.
The Federal Elections Commission, originally a component of the administration-
supported Scott-Mathias bill, was included by the Senate despite Democratic opposition.
As administration support for the independent commission waned, however, the super-
visory function was embodied in more traditional organs: the Secretary of the Senate,
the Clerk of the House and the Comptroller General.
Finally, on February 7, 1972, President Nixon signed the Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971 (Pub. L. No. 92-225) into law. The law took effect on April 7, 1972, thus
exempting the New Hampshire, Florida, Illinois and Wisconsin primaries from its pro-
visions.
95 Communications media include "broadcasting stations, newspapers, magazines,
outdoor advertising facilities and telephones." Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-
225, tit. I, § 102(1).
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of disclosure of federal campaign funds; and Title IV is basically a
repeal of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act."
A. Title I
Title I of the Campaign Act strives to halt the spiraling cost of
political campaigning by requiring broadcast stations, during the 45
days preceding the primary and the 60 days preceding the general
election, to charge the lowest unit rate that the station would other-
wise charge for the same class and time of advertising. 7 But this
will not really diminish broadcast expenditures as much as antici-
pated because most stations already give discounts to political candi-
dates. 8
Originally, the Campaign Act was drafted to include, as well, an
amendment to the Communications Act of 1934 that would repeal
the equal time provision"9 - which requires that, if a broadcast sta-
tion gives free time to one candidate, it must give an equal amount
of free time to each of the other candidates, including those of minor
parties.'00 The purpose of the amendment, in addition to aiding
the reduction of broadcasting expenditures, was to give candidates
for public office greater access to the media so that they could better
explain their stand on the issues and more completely inform the
voters.101
06 2 U.S.C. §§ 241-56 (1970), repealed by Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225,
tit. IV, § 405.
07 Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No.-92-225, tit. I, § 103. This is an amendment to
the Communications Act of 1934 [47 U.S.C. § 315(b) (1970)] which stated that "the
charges made for the use of any broadcast station for any of the purposes set forth in
section 315 may not exceed the charges made for comparable use of the station for other
purposes." Under section 315(b), political candidates were often charged more for the
same amount of space or time than were major advertisers. Thus, the amendment en-
sures that the lowest advertising rate will always be charged.
98 CBS network stations already charge the lowest net rate. 1971 Hearings on S.
382, supra note 4, at 328 (letter from Frank Stanton, President of CBS, to Senator Hugh
Scott, Feb. 12, 1971). ABC gives a 33 percent discount. Id. at 329 (letter from
Everett Erlich of ABC to Senator Scott, Feb. 12, 1971). NBC gives a 50 percent dis-
count. Id. at 408 (testimony of Julian Goodman, President of NBC).
These discounts also exist on a non-network basis. A survey of stations in the Cleve-
land area (compiled by the author from conversations with advertising managers at
Cleveland radio stations WKYC, WJW and WEWS) found discounts ranging from
25 to 50 percent for political candidates.
9947 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970).
100 S. 382, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(a)(1) (1971).
101 Section 315 (a) of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 - the "equal time"
provision - was suspended in 1960 for presidential candidates to allow the Nixon-
Kennedy debates. SJ. RES. 207, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 106 CONG. REc. 17739 (1960).
Without such suspension the networks would have had to give all the minor party can-
didates equal time.
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The repeal of the equal time provision most likely would have
achieved these results, and Congress apparently missed an opportun-
ity to significantly lower political broadcast expenditures when it
dropped the repeal amendment from the final version of the act.11
2
While Congress' failure to act is primarily attributable to political
exigencies, it would also seem that a repeal of the equal time provi-
sion would have conflicted with the policy and rationale behind the
prohibition against political contributions by corporations. A radio
or television station permitted to give unrestricted amounts of free
time to candidates of their choice, without reciprocal treatment to
others, would be no different than the corporate body of that station
directly contributing cash to the candidate.
The spending limitations imposed by Title I provide that a can-
didate may spend for the use of communications media the greater
of: (1) $50,000; or (2) 10 cents multiplied by the voting age
population'03 of the electorate. °4 And the candidate is permitted to
spend up to 60 percent of this amount on the broadcast media.'0 5
In order to take account of inflationary cost increases, the act provides
for periodic adjustments to the spending formula based on the Con-
sumer Price Index.'06 Because of the broad definition of the term
As the table below illustrates, little free time is presently being offered to political
candidates.
Free Time to All Candidates on TV
Year Hours and Minutes
1956 29:38
1960 39:22
1964 4:28
1968 3:01
H. ALEXANDBR, supra note 6, at 102.
102 If the equal time provision had been repealed, CBS would have offered 8 hours
of free network time to each party. NBC pledged an additional 4 hours to each party.
1971 Hearings on S. 382, supra note 4, at 388,408.
103 Voting age population is defined as the resident population 18 years and older.
Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225, tit. I, § 102(5).
104 Id. § 104(a)(1)(A). Under section 104(a)(1)(C)(5), during the first week of
January in each year, the Secretary of Commerce "shall certify to the ComptroUer Gen-
eral and publish in the Federal Register an estimate of the voting age population of each
state and congressional district for the last calendar year ending before the date of certi-
fication."
105 Id. § 104(a)(1)(B). Under section 104 of the Senate bill, the candidate, at his
discretion, could spend between 30 and 70 percent of his total allocation on broadcast
advertising.
106 Id. § 104(a)(4). The mechanism for adjustment of the spending limitation for-
mula is detailed in section 104(a)(4)(B). "At the beginning of each calendar year ....
the Secretary of Labor shall certify to the Comptroller General and publish in the Fed-
eral Register the per centum difference between the price index for the 12 months pre-
ceding the beginning of such calendar year and the price index for the base period."
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.communications media,"'10 these limitations cover all the important
kinds of campaign media advertising.
Critical to an understanding of the mechanics of the spending
limitations, is the separation of primary and general election con-
tests. Each primary, general, special or run-off election is treated as
a separate election and has a separate expenditure limitation applica-
ble to it. And for all candidates, other than presidential, the limita-
tions applicable to the use of the communications media are the
same for both a primary and a general election;' 8 i.e., 10 cents times
the number of voters or $50,000, whichever is greater. Thus, a
typical candidate for the Senate would be permitted to spend a total
of 20 cents per eligible voter, or $100,000.109
In the case of a presidential candidate, the separate election con-
cept is equally applicable, but the aggregate amount of his spending
limitation is allocated on a state-by-state basis. A presidential candi-
date may spend, for use of the communications media in a state pri-
mary, an amount equal to -that available to a Senate candidate from
that state."0 And for the general presidential election, the limitations
on the use of the communication media in any one state are like-
wise based upon the -eligible electorate in -that state.111
The concept of an aggregate expenditure ceiling is not new, as
evidenced by the discussion of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act.
But the crucial questions regarding any such scheme still remain: is
a ceiling advisable at all; and if so, are the given limitations work-
able within the realities of campaign finance. In his testimony be-
fore the Communications Subcommittee holding hearings on the
act, Herbert Alexander, a leading expert on campaign finance, stated
that an aggregate ceiling would favor the incumbent candidate
while the absence of a ceiling would conversely permit the high
spending usually necessary to challenge an incumbent.1 ' Rather
than a ceiling, Alexander favored the idea of a publicly subsidized
minimum amount sufficient to guarantee a candidate adequate expo-
Then the amounts determined under the spending limitation formula will be increased
by the per centum difference.
10 7 See note 95 supra & accompanying text.
108 Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225, tit. I, § 104(a)(2).
3 0 9 The spending limitations for each election must be accounted separately. Thus,
a candidate could not "save up" from the primary and then spend more than the $50,000
or 10 cents per voter limitation in the general election.
110Id. § 104 (a)(3).
Ill Id. § 10 4 (a).
112 1971 Hearings on S. 382, supra note 4, at 644-45 (testimony of Herbert Alex-
ander).
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sure to the public.118  But Alexander's criticism may be less perti-
nent than it appears at first blush: even with no effective spending
limitations, there has been a very high rate of incumbent reelec-
tion." 4 Consequently, the imposition of a ceiling should not portend
any significant increase in that rate.
Overall, the most persuasive argument for a ceiling is the continu-
ing upward spiral in the cost of running for office. The problem,
then, is to create a ceiling which curbs rising costs but is high enough
to permit the challenger to adequately present himself to the public.
The major difficulty in ascertaining whether spending limitations are
realistic is the unavailability of appropriate statistics concerning past
expenditures. One recent survey shows that 70 percent of the U.S.
Senators spent over $100,000 on their last campaigns, 40 percent
spent over $200,000,115 and three of every 10 members of the House
spent over $60,000.116 But these figures are difficult to assess in
terms of the Campaign Finance Act because they reflect total cam-
paign expenditures - including salary and travel expenses and pub-
lic opinion polls - while the act regulates only expenses for the
communications media.
Although few statistics are available to provide an overall analy-
sis of the Campaign Act's per-vote formula for computing the ceil-
ing, a partial study has been made which compared 1970 broadcast
advertising expenditures by Senate candidates with the highest pos-
sible expenditure for broadcast advertising available to the candidate
under the Campaign Act. 17  The comparison indicated that the
typical candidate must decrease his spending for broadcast adver-
tising in order to comply with the new law, in direct contrast to the
upward spiral of campaign spending that currently exists." 8
The present broadcast spending limitation is certainly more rea-
sonable than that provided under the defunct Federal Corrupt Prac-
tices Act." 9 Still, because candidates will be required to adjust their
campaign expenditures downward, emphasis must once again be
placed on the need for a workable system of disclosure and en-
forcement to prohibit a candidate from violating the new law.
1131Id.
114 From 1954 to 1968, 85 percent of all Senators who ran for reelection won,
while 92 percent of all House members who ran for reelection won. TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND REPORT, supra note 24, at 3.
115 The statistics quoted are cited in Hearings on S. 2876 before the Committee on
Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 91-29, at 51 (1971).
116 Id.
117 1971 Hearings on S. 382, supra note 4, at 612 (testimony of Professor David
Adamany of Wesleyan University).
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B. Title II
The amendments to the Election and Political Activities Laws
constituting Title II of the Campaign Act contain several substantial
revisions of campaign finiance laws, including: (1) a repeal of the
limitation on the amount of individual contributions; (2) a limita-
tion of the amount of expenditures a candidate may make from his
personal funds; (3) a redefining of "political committee" to do away
with the requirement of operating in two or more states; (4) an
amendment of the prohibition against contributions from corpora-
tions and labor uriions; (5) a redefining of "election" to include
primaries; and (6) an expansion of the definition of political con-
tribution and expenditure.
The most significant of these revisions, in terms of the earlier
discussion concerning the problems associated with the large indi-
vidual contribution, is the repeal of the $5,000 limitation for anyone
making a political contribution.'" It would seem that this change
directly contradicts the rationale behind the reform concept of pro-
tecting against the dangers of the large individual contribution.
In committee, the following reasons were put forth to justify the re-
peal of the old limitation: (1) such a limitation is probably uncon-
Comparison between actual amounts spent on broadcast media by senatorial
candidates in the 1970 general election and the permissible broadcast spend-
ing the limitation applicable to seiatorial candidates under Pub. L. No. 92-225.
Individual
Candidate Pub. L No. Change
State 1970 Expenses 92-225 Difference
Alaska 34,006 31,290 -2,716
Arizona 85,388 63,988 -21,400
Hawaii 64,954 31,290 -33,664
Indiana 353,012 181,847 -171,165
Missouri 231,518 168,027 -63,491
Nevada 73,788 31,290 -42,498
New Jersey 391,485 261,689 -129,796
New Mexico 35,451 31,290 -4,161
North Dakota 71,491 31,290 -40,201
Utah 115,312 31,290 -84,022
Vermont 69,668 31,290 -38,378
Wyoming 47,596 31,290 -16,306
Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225 (Table A, Legislative History), U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 88 (1972). The expenditures for candidates under Pub. L. No.
92-225 were determined by use of the 60 percent allotment for broadcast advertising
as allowed under section 104(a)(1)(B) and includes an additional 4.3 percent to reflect
inflationary increases.
118 See note 2 supra & accompanying text.
119 See note 36 supra & accompanying text.
120 Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225, tit. II, § 203, amending 18 U.S.C. §
608 (1970).
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stitutional; (2) it is completely unworkable; and (3) full disclosure
makes such limitations unnecessary.' 2 ' Although the unconstitution-
ality argument may be well taken, 22 the most convincing rationale
for repeal of any contribution limitation is the presence of the full
disclosure requirement (the specifics of which will be discussed
shortly). The requirement that campaign contributions be fully dis-
closed, makes the politician readily subject to any accurate charges
of misconduct or conflict of interest, thereby precluding the need to
continue restrictions on personal contributions. Moreover, in the
context of the entire scheme of campaign finance legislation, if
means are provided for obtaining funds which would reduce the re-
liance on the large contribution, a statutory limitation on personal
contributions becomes much less relevant.
One kind of quasi-contribution limitation was included, how-
ever. Perhaps with a view towards preventing the situation in which
the rich candidate is in a better position to gain access to an elected
121 S. REP. No. 92-229, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 131 (1971).
122 For a number of years, various commentators have argued that restrictions on the
amount of spending in a political campaign and requirements of public disclosure of
contributions and contributors were violations of the first amendment. A recent dis-
cussion of this issue comes from Martin H. Redish. Redish, Campaign Spending Laws
and the First Amendment, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 900 (1971).
Redish uses New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), in conjunction
with Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 393 U.S. 367 (1964), and Mills v. Alabama,
384 U.S. 214 (1966), to support his theory that the "first amendment ... renders suspect
any regulations which have the effect of reducing total amount of expression on public
questions." Redish, supra, at 910. But despite his theory, Redish admits that the Su-
preme Court, if faced with the issue directly, might feel that neutralization of the up-
ward spiral of campaign spending would justify such a limited infringement upon free
expression of information and opinion - particularly in view of the relatively high
ceiling imposed by the new law.
In the area of public disclosure, Redish links United States v. Rumley, 345 U.S. 41
(1953), NAACP v. Alabama, 337 U.S. 449 (1953), Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960), and Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (cases protecting the privacy of
membership lists and organization affiliations), to develop a first amendment right of
anonymity which would protect the candidate and political parties from mandatory dis-
closure. While the validity of such a first amendment right is questionable, there are
strong government interests in requiring full disclosure of campaign contributions and
contributors. Foremost among these is that full disclosure provides the electorate a
measure of protection from political favoritism - both legal and illegal - toward cam-
paigu benefactors.
Almost any campaign finance regulation is likely to have some effect on first amend-
ment rights. In the area of spending limitations, it would seem that infringement on
the first amendment rights would be minimal if a candidate was forced by the spending
limitation to show only 75 television commercials instead of the 100 planned. The
compelling governmental interest in giving candidates virtual spending equality and in
requiring disclosure to prevent possible corruption seems to outweigh the mild distur-
bance of first amendment rights.
Perhaps the most interesting comment upon these first amendment questions is the
total absence of pertinent case law. Of course, this again attests to the fact that the
Federal Corrupt Practices Act was virtually unenforced.
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office, Congress set limitations on the expenditures a candidate may
make from his personal funds (including those of his immediate
family): $50,000 in the case of a candidate for President or Vice-
President; $35,000 for a Senate candidate; and $25,000 for a House
candidate.123
Other amendments in Title II are directed at dosing the obvious
loopholes existing in the old laws. No longer is a candidate able to
decentralize his campaign finances by using state-level committees.
Under the Campaign Act, the old definition of "political committee"
(requiring operation in two or more states) is replaced by "any
individual, committee, association, or organization which accepts con-
tributions or makes expenditures during a calendar year in an aggre-
gate amount exceeding $1,000."14 The ultimate effect of this
change will be to centralize a candidate's finances under one major
committee, which will incidentally lessen the burden imposed by the
reporting provisions.
Unfortunately, Congress failed to close the loophole which per-
mits corporations and labor unions to contribute millions of dollars
through political action committees. Indeed, the amendment to the
general prohibition against corporate and union contributions actually
serves to sanction the committee device by specifically permitting
it. 2'5 This is particularly disconcerting since the amendment also
broadens the phrase "contribution or expenditure" as used in this
prohibition, 12 and because, without the explicit congressional ap-
proval of the political action committee contribution, the courts might
have been persuaded to close this blatant loophole.
Title II further provides a criminal sanction for any direct or
indirect promise of employment or other benefit by a candidate to a
123 Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225, tit. II, § 203. Realistically, however,
it seems possible to avoid this restriction by using various relatives, friends and other
conduits through which personal funds could be funneled into the campaign. A re-
cent example of just such contribution practices can be seen in the disclosure of cam-
paign contributions and contributors by several Democratic presidential candidates be-
fore the effective date of Pub. L. No. 92-225. The sums attributed to numerous contrib-
utors are in excess of the $5,000 limitation which existed under 18 U.S.C. § 608 (1970),
but the contributors simply spread the contribution among relatives and friends or gave
the contributions to various decentralized committees. Although the latter loophole has
been eliminated, the former still remains available to the candidate seeking to avoid the
personal funds limitation.
124 Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L No. 92-225, tit. II, § 201, amending 18 U.S.C. §
591 (1970).
125 Id.
1261d.
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contributor.127  But this prohibition, which is a reenactment of a
section of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, is most likely unenforce-
able.12' Aside from the obvious evidentiary problems, the idea of
what would constitute an indirect promise is extremely vague. Other
revisions which merit mention are: the change in the term "elec-
tion," as used in the Election and Political Activities Laws, to include
primary and special runoff elections;129 and the expansion of the
term "contribution" to include the payment of compensation to a per-
son who is working for a political candidate.""0
C. Title III
In the last analysis, it is the disclosure system which will deter-
mine whether the provisions of the Campaign Act are adhered to.
The disclosure scheme must be capable of determining whether the
expenditure ceiling has been violated and of fully informing the
public of the nature and amount of the contributions to a candi-
date's campaign. Thus, the disclosure requirements under Title III
of the Act should be examined for their effectiveness in eliminating
the reporting deficiencies evident under past legislation and in insu-
lating the enforcement mechanisms from political pressures.
Under the reporting scheme, a "political committee" is defined
- as it was for purposes of Title II - as any committee, associa-
tion, or organization which accepts contributions or makes expendi-
tures in an aggregate amount exceeding $1,000. 1  The minimum
dollar requirement seems reasonable since circumvention of any dis-
closure provision would occur only if a candidate created a multi-
tude of small committees to hide donations - an unlikely possibility
considering the potential for impairing the candidate's public image
if he violated the spirit of the law in such a way.
Each political committee is required to have a chairman and a
127 Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225, tit. II, § 202, amending 18 U.S.C. §
600 (1970).
128 Since section 600 is essentially unenforceable, it might appear that stronger
means of preventing favoritism to big contributors is warranted. An absolute prohibi-
tion on extending employment or any other benefit to a person who contributed over a
certain amount would be one way of minimizing the problem. Of course, this method
also prevents qualified contributors from employment; but if the problem of favoritism
is deemed serious enough, such broad measures would be desirable.
129 Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225, tit. II, § 201, amending 18 U.S.C. §
591 (1970).
130 Id.
131 Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225, tit. III, § 301(d). The $1,000 limita-
tion was found to be the most feasible by the Twentieth Century Fund. TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND REPORT, supra note 24, at 16.
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treasurer. 2 The treasurer must keep a detailed accounting of all
contributions in excess of $10, including the amount, the name, and
the address of the contributor." 3 Likewise, the treasurer must keep
an accounting of all committee expenditures in excess of $100.1"
Each treasurer of a political committee and each candidate must file
with a supervisory officer (as designated by the act) 35 formal re-
ports of receipts and expenditures.' 36  These reports are due on the
10th day of March, June and September of each year, and on the 15th
and fifth days preceding the date of an election.2 7
The reports are extremely detailed and require the disclosure of:
(1) cash on hand at the beginning of the reporting period; (2) the
name and address of each person who makes a contribution in an
aggregate amount in excess of $100 and the amount of such contri-
bution; (3) the total sum of individual contributions; (4) the
amount of funds transferred between political committees; (5) any
loans to or from any person in an aggregate amount in excess of
$100; (6) the proceeds obtained from fund raising events and the
sale of campaign materials; (7) all other receipts in excess of $100,
if not otherwise listed; (8) the total sum of all receipts; (9) the
name and address of each person to whom an expenditure is made
in an aggregate amount exceeding $100 and the amount and purpose
of the expenditure; (10) the name and address of each person, as
well as the amount and to whom an expenditure is made in excess of
$100 for personal services or salaries; (11) the total sum of expendi-
tures made; ('12) the amount and nature of all debts and obliga-
tions; and (13) such other information as required by the super-
visory officer.'2 8
Furthermore, additional comprehensive reports must be filed with
the Comptroller General concerning the financing of national party
conventions. 2 9 If these accounting and reporting requirements are
adhered to, they should provide all the information necessary to de-
termine any spending or contribution violations. And the exten-
1
2 Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225, tit. II, § 302(a).
133 Id. § 302(c).
134 Id. § 302(d).
135 Id. § 301(g).
1361d. § 304(a).
137Id.
1381d. § 304(b)(1)-(13).
139 1d. § 307. The report on convention financing must be filed not more than 60
days following the convention. The Comptroller General is to prescribe requirements
for the report, which must include the sources of campaign funds and the purposes for
which such funds were expended.
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sive disclosure requirements should in themselves be sufficient to
discourage any such violations.
The supervisory officer to whom the above reports are made is
required to develop an indexing and filing system for the reports,
publish the reports no more than two days after they are received,
and prepare a comprehensive annual report.40 The supervisory of-
ficer must also report "apparent violations" to the Justice Depart-
ment."" Moreover, any person (including a corporation, etc.) is
given standing to file a complaint with the supervisory officer. 142
Upon such a complaint, the officer must determine if there is a sub-
stantial reason to believe that a violation has occurred. If so, he is to
expedite an investigation; and if a hearing shows that "any person
has engaged or is about to engage in any acts or practices which con-
stitute or will constitute a violation ...the Attorney General ...
shall institute a civil action for relief, including a permanent or
temporary injunction, restraining order, or any other appropriate
order .... 143
On its face, this procedure seems to provide for a relatively ade-
quate system of enforcement. Yet it masks several problems, the
most important being that the supervisory officer is the Secretary of
the Senate or the Clerk of the House, for Senate and House candi-
dates, respectively. 144  Consequently, with the exception of presiden-
tial candidates, whose supervisory officer is the Comptroller Gen-
14 0 Id. § 308(a).
141 d. § 308(a)(12).
142Id. § 308(d).
143 ld.
144 Id. § 301(g).
The Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House are not isolated from politics.
(Cf. U.S. GOVT. ORG. MANUAL 1971-72, 19-20 (1971), which describes the duties of
these individuals.) In fact, the very people whom they must regulate and investigate
under the Campaign Act elected them to their positions. Professor David Adamany of
Wesleyan University expressed the problem of using the Secretary of the Senate and the
Clerk of the House as Supervisory Officers:
For decades the Secretary [of the Senate) and the Clerk [of the House) have
been filing officers under the existing Federal statutes. In these decades a pat-
tern has been created of accepting reports without question and simply mak-
ing them available to the public. I do not believe that a change in the stain-
tory rules will change the deeply ingrained view that the Secretary and the
Clerk are merely filing officers. An Elections Commission, on the other hand,
because it is freshly created, would be more likely dramatically to alter the
reporting forms effectively to obtain information. It would also because of
its bi-partisan composition, be more likely to investigate thoroughly and report
violations in the reports.
1971 Hearings on S. 382, supra note 4, at 609 (testimony of Professor David Adamany
of Wesleyan University).
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era 4 5 (a long-term appointee), candidates must report to partisan
officers who are not only subject to political pressures but are also
chosen for their respective positions by the very persons whom they
have the duty to investigate.
The Senate version of the Campaign Act would have given the
role of the supervisory officers to an independent Federal Elections
Commission consisting of six members appointed by the President to
serve staggered 12-year terms.146  Although not as potentially effec-
tive as the Senate version, the conference committee substitute is not
as ineffective as its predecessor under the Federal Corrupt Practices
Act, where the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate
were also entrusted with the administration and enforcement of the
disclosure provisions. The principal distinction between the two is
that, under the Campaign Act, the respective officials acting as super-
visory officers are required to publish the individual reports as they
receive them, and also to publish a comprehensive annual report. 4 '
Under the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, the officers merely held
open for inspection those reports that had been submitted.1 48 The
publication requirements are a considerable improvement and should
be sufficient to counteract any laxness on the part of the supervisory
officers. Similarly, the officers' diligence should be encouraged by
the provision allowing any person to charge a violation and file a
complaint with the supervisory officer - although this mechanism
is not as strong as it might be because the officer still has the unfet-
tered power to conclude that there is no substantial reason to con-
duct an investigation. 49 Again, however, the requirement of public
disclosure of the campaign finance reports should act to guard against
nonaction where the facts warrant an investigation.
The Justice Department remains the ultimate repository for en-
forcement of the Act's provisions; and if criminal action is war-
ranted, it is always within the discretion of the Department to prose-
cute. Unfortunately, serious problems are presented by the highly
political nature of the actions involved and the political character of
the Justice Department itself. But the Campaign Act does provide
that the Attorney General shall institute a civil action if, in the
judgment of the supervisory officer, a violation has occurred or is
14 Id
146 S. 382, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 310 (1971).
1 47
_Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225, ti. III, § 308(a).
148 2 U.S.C. § 247 (1970), repealed by Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225, tit.
Iv, § 405.
1 49 Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225, tit. III, § 308(d).
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about to occur. 150 This terminology indicates that the Justice De-
partment has no discretion in filing suit, although this interpretation
is partially undercut by the precondition of the supervisory officer's
determination. Once again, however, public disclosure should help
secure a fair and impartial determination.
Nevertheless, the conference committee compromise deleting the
machinery of the Federal Elections Commission represents a substan-
tial shortcoming in the Campaign Act. The establishment of a purely
independent and politically autonomous commission, 151 as contained
in the Senate version, would have ensured the effective enforcement
of the Campaign Act's regulatory provisions.
V. CONCLUSION
Virtually any new legislation would be an improvement over
the ancient, unrealistic and unenforced campaign finance laws which
have existed since 1925. Doubts remain, however, as to how sub-
stantial an improvement the Campaign Act is over previous legisla-
tion, and whether the new law is a complete answer to the problems
of campaign finance, or whether it is merely a stop-gap means of
regulation.
The new law creates relatively realistic spending limitations in
place of the impracticably low limits set by the Federal Corrupt
Practices Act, which led to nonenforcement and commonplace avoid-
ance. The law also centralizes campaign finance under one com-
mittee for each candidate, rather than encouraging a system of de-
centralized committees which were immune from effective regulation
and were speciously deemed to operate without the candidate's knowl-
edge. The crux of the new legislation is a system of public disclo-
sure requiring that reports be filed and published before the general
election. In addition, the new law gives any individual standing to
file a complaint alleging a campaign violation.
Despite these improvements, however, the Campaign Act is hamp-
ered by several problems. Given spending limitations which, al-
though realistic, will represent a spending decrease for most candi-
dates, the legislation should have attempted to lower campaign costs
(presuming, as Congress did, that campaign activity should be main-
tained at its present level). The second problem with the new leg-
islation is the failure to vest disclosure supervision, with respect to
congressional candidates, in an independent commission. But re-
150Id. § 308(d)(1).
151 S. 382, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 310 (1971).
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gardless of these shortcomings, the Federal Election Campaign Act
has the potential to curb excessive campaign spending and provide
a workable system of public disclosure.
In assessing the Campaign Act as a final solution to the problems
of campaign finance, it is dear that the legislators could have gone
further. But it must be remembered that - unlike other regulatory
areas - Congress here is regulating its own conduct. Thus, a some-
what "soft" approach may be politically unavoidable and the Cam-
paign Act of 1971 may be the best regulation of campaign finance
that could have been enacted.
As long as campaign finance is based on a system of private con-
tributions, the large contributor will have the power to influence
the politician. One alternative to the present system of financing
campaigns is a program of public subsidization, which will be avail-
able for the 1976 presidential election under Tax Checkoff. Al-
though there is some sentiment for repealing Tax Checkoff, hopefully
the plan will be allowed to take effect, if only to give the legislators
a unique opportunity to compare the effectiveness of a partial system
of public subsidization with that of a relatively well-regulated system
based on private contributions.
JOEL M. COCKRELL
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